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Abstract:  the present article questions the institutional preconditions for solving problems of 
interdependency in urban areas. Policy coordination in terms of processes as well as outcomes 
serves as an indicator for the collective capacity to act. Hypotheses are derived from two in-
stitutionalist schools: first, from the neoprogressive model that stands for direct public service 
provision by centralized and professionalised bureaucracies within consolidated municipalities, 
and second, from the public choice model that represents a decentralized, non-professional, and 
politically dependent administration in fragmented urban areas. the results of the comparison 
of seventeen case studies regarding the integration of urban transport and land use policies in 
Western european urban areas employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) show that 
well co-ordinated policy decisions are only implemented in institutional settings that largely cor-
respond to the neoprogressive model.
Keywords:  Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) · urban areas · Policy coordination · 
Neo-institutionalism · Collective capacity to act
Institutionelle Bedingungen kollektiver Handlungsfähigkeit im urbanen 
Raum: Eine QCA von siebzehn europäischen Entscheidungsfällen
Zusammenfassung: Der vorliegende Aufsatz fragt nach den institutionellen Bedingungen für 
die Bewältigung von Interdependenzproblemen im urbanen Raum. Als Messgrösse für kollektive 
Handlungsfähigkeit wird die Qualität von Politikkoordination im Prozess und im entscheidungs-
ergebnis gewählt. für die empirische untersuchung werden zwei einander entgegen gesetzte 
verwaltungswissenschaftliche Modelle metropolitaner Institutionen hergeleitet und Hypothesen 
formuliert: Einerseits steht das neoprogressive Modell für Zentralisierung, konsolidierte Raum-
strukturen sowie eine professionelle und politisch unabhängige Verwaltung. Andererseits steht 
das Public Choice-Modell für Dezentralisierung, fragmentierte Raumstrukturen sowie eine un-
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professionelle und politisch abhängige Verwaltung. Die Resultate des Vergleichs von siebzehn 
fallstudien zu raumwirksamen entscheidungsprozessen in westeuropäischen stadträumen mithil-
fe Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) weisen die neoprogressiven Postulate als leistungs-
fähiger für Politikkoordination aus als das Public Choice-Modell.
Schlüsselwörter:  Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) · urbane Räume ·  
Politikkoordination · Neo-Institutionalismus · kollektive Handlungsfähigkeit
1  Introduction
Western european urban areas are increasingly confronted with a dualistic pressure. On 
the one hand, a trend towards economical and demographical concentration consists in 
the so-called metropolitan areas. These gain economical, social and cultural importance 
due to international competition. the problem-solving competences of these conurbations 
in respect of formal policy do not correspond to their problems regarding the formulation 
and realization of policy. A united front consisting both of urban and rural areas towards 
superior state-levels can be regarded as one solution. On the other hand, an increasing 
tendency towards fragmentation within urban conurbations could prevent a necessary and 
requested inner unity. Moreover, the migration from core municipalities is distinguished 
by contrary, self-amplified mechanisms, causing a vicious circle of urban sprawl: the 
more people migrate to rural areas, the less attractive the core municipalities become. 
In consequence, even more people migrate. Due to this particular situation, urban areas 
are confronted with a special call for action. A deadlock threatens because of cumulating 
problems within the metropolitan areas combined with the development of large-scaled 
centers of power and growing international competition. this may obstruct both the inter-
nal and external latitude. The solution is generally seen in a cross-sectional cooperation 
between urban and rural areas, aiming at coordinating political programs in different 
fields of policy (Benz 1994; Blatter 2005; Heinz 2000; Le Galès 1998; sager 2002).
Core municipalities and surrounding rural areas are thus faced with the problem of the 
collective capacity to act. There is a specific need for “modes coping with interdepend-
encies, which aim at the restoration and stabilization of a collective capacity to act for a 
majority of individual players” (schimank 2002, p. 31). It will be argued in the following 
that the coordination of policy proves to be a suitable measurement for the collective 
capacity to act. two competing hypotheses are derived from two different institutionalist 
schools of metropolitan institutions, which will both be used to define policy coordina-
tion. the neoprogressive model relates to Weber’s (1972) analysis of bureaucracy and is 
associated with the sociological institutionalism of “bounded rationality” (Jones 2003). 
the public choice model is associated with the economical institutionalism (Ostrom and 
Ostrom 1971). The analysis focuses on the structures of public administration, being the 
most crucial form of social institutions of modern society (zucker 1983, p. 1). The essay 
is structured as follows:
The next section deals with intellectually positioning and discussing the two different 
approaches, the neoprogressive and the public choice school. The section after that will 
present the problem of policy coordination to question the collective capacity to act, and 
as a dependent factor for the empirical analysis, and will conclude with the hypotheses. 
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The then following section introduces the research strategy, the case choices, the method 
of the empirical studies to be examined and the operationalisation of the variables. The 
subsequent empirical analysis consists of the systematic comparison of seventeen case 
studies pertaining to policy coordination in Western european urban areas. this will be 
based on the macro-qualitative method of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)1. 
This method is applicable for the present analysis, since, on the one hand, it is especially 
suited for a medium range of case studies; on the other hand, the focus is not on isolated 
effects of singular variables, nor of conditions, in terms of QCA, but rather on combined 
effects of different values and conditions. the deduction consists of a summarizing appre-
ciation of the cognizance.
2  Two models of metropolitan institutions
As Krücken (2002, p. 227) ascertains, a “rediscovery of institutionalized concepts is to be 
observed within the disciplinary triangle of sociology, political science and economics” 
since the 1980’s. This neo-institutionalism is based on the interface of organizational, 
economical and networking research (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). the present analysis 
utilizes the trend which “primarily serves as a generator of theory of medium range in 
present research” (Krücken 2002) to question the institutional preconditions for success-
ful policy coordination. Based on the research of scott and Meyer (1991), four central 
dimensions of organization are identified as being relevant for the social and political 
behavior and for political decision making within organizations: (1) centralization versus 
decentralization, (2) urban consolidation versus urban fragmentation, (3) professionali-
zation versus non-professional administration, and (4) autonomic administration versus 
politically dependent administration.
Based on the literature, two institutional designs will be extracted along these four 
dimensions, which can be postulated on the basis of the schools of the progressive reform-
ers and of the public choice model.
2.1  Neoprogressive model: centralization, consolidation, professionally and politically 
independent administration
the us-American school of the progressive reformers evolved out of the discontent-
ment over corrupt regimes in American cities in the late 19th century. the reoccurring 
postulates of the Progressive Movement in the administrative science discussion during 
the 1990’s (Hill 1991; Goodsell 1994) were a response to the triumph of the public choice 
concept. the supporters of Lowery’s (1999) newly labeled “neoprogressive” school par-
ticularly encounter the fundamental public choice argument concerning state failure with 
1 even though the number of users of the QCA-method is increasing in international research 
(compare the internet platform http://compass.org/), only few studies employ the advantages of 
this approach in the German Language Area (Berg-schlosser and Quenter 1996; Obinger 1998; 
sager 2002). the discussion is otherwise limited to essays in methodological school literature 
(Berg-schlosser 1997; Wagschal 1999; schneider and Wagemann 2007).
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the understanding that the market instruments fail in several public fields. Recent studies 
recognize both the theoretical argument and the empirical success of the public choice 
model, and demand a differentiated debate, which basically amounts to renewing the 
concept of the administrative model of the Progressive Movement (Lowery 1999, p. 47; 
sager 2005).
The institutional model, which represents the neoprogressive school, can be described 
with the following four hypothetical postulates within the analytical dimensions of scott 
and Meyer (1991): centralization, consolidation, professionalization and autonomy.
0  the centralization postulate basically corresponds to Weber’s rational bureaucracy 
model containing the element of hierarchical structure (Weber 1972). A tendency of 
centralization exists due to the fact that the higher levels control the subordinated 
levels, and that the governing bodies are organized monocratically and not collegially. 
Due to intensified organizational control, more standardized and calculated perform-
ance is achieved and work-sharing differentiation encouraged. this system optimizes 
the synoptic capacities of administration and avoids bureaucratic arbitrariness on dif-
ferent levels, thus increasing the efficiency of public acting through scale effects and 
the omission of coordination costs (Nigro and Nigro 1989, p. 110).
0  the argument of urban consolidation is crucial in the neoprogressive argumentation. 
Keating (1995, p. 118–123) refers to four lines of argumentation: (1) efficiency, (2) 
democracy, (3) equality of distribution and (4) urban development. The argument of 
efficiency is primarily based on an economical point of view. Minimal project size, 
accruing costs of coordination in fragmented areas and decreasing average costs are 
arguments speaking for consolidation (cf. Wittek and flache 2002, p. 62 regarding 
the transaction costs theory). The argument of democracy states, on the one hand, that 
large urban units appear stronger confronting superior state levels. On the other hand, 
the comparative analysis of Lyons et al. (1992) concludes that minorities participate 
more in consolidated units and are better informed about political structures in their 
community, contrary to residents of fragmented systems. The argument of distribu-
tion postulates that consolidated areal units lead to more justice of distribution, result-
ing in a greater contentment of its residents, as opposed to fragmented conurbations. 
Finally, the argument of development states that consolidated urban unities enhance 
the competitive position of the overall area, thus ensuring economical development.
0  the postulate of professionalism founds in the belief of the progressive reformers 
(West 1995, p. 5) in technology and modernization. From the outset, it manifests 
itself in the demand for well-educated and specialized knowhow for the well-being of 
society, respectively for the administration. Planning literature of the 1960’s uses the 
criteria of professional specialization and differentiation to attribute the advantages 
of functional differentiation concerning the cognitive preconditions for cooperative 
action (Nigro and Nigro 1989, p. 110; Simon 1962). One can refer to the concept of 
epistemic community (Haas 1964), which was primarily developed for the analysis 
of international negotiations. An epistemic community consists of a network of pro-
fessional experts in specific fields of policy, whose knowledge of particular policy 
contents is of central relevance (Haas 1992, p. 3). The generated and reproduced 
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knowledge, achieved by mutual education and mutual professional values, leads to a 
cross-bordered, sectoral consensus of these players. Since a rational, political result 
is the goal, and not the appeasement of particular interests, such professional values 
lead to a consensual cross-bordered coordination of policy.
0  the postulate of political independence roots in one of the founder writings of the 
progressive movement, in which Wilson (1887) names the lack of separating political 
and administrative areas as the root of corruption and injustice. the term autonomy 
applies to the political administration as a stand-alone partner of negotiation within 
the political process. Autonomy is meant in terms of corresponding to the political 
administration’s own political latitude, which is defined by a clear delimitation of 
competences from legislature. It is therefore a matter of a limited political capacity 
for action, being protected from outside influences. Such interventions can not only 
result from singular interferences through legislature, but also from the influence of 
economical and social singular interests, or from the participation of politically con-
cerned parties. A high-level autonomy of administration counteracts the neutraliza-
tion of expert knowledge through political influence, thus enabling problem-related 
coordination of public action (Wolf 1993).
the public choice model presented in the following section stands fully contrary to these 
postulates:
2.2  Public choice: decentralization, fragmentation, non-professional and politically 
dependent administration
With their essay “Public choice: A Different Approach to Public Administration” from 
1971 (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971), Elinor and Vincent Ostrom broke with the almost 100 
year-old progressive dominance in American administration science. the newly postu-
lated, political-economical understanding of administration contained new paradigms. 
They were part of an extensive sociological concept of the rational choice theory, which 
posed “a radical and provocative program for the research of organizations in their ortho-
dox form” (Wittek and Flache 2002, p. 55, also Hay 2004).
the principle line of argument of the public choice model in administration can be 
summarized following the premises of the economical theory of policy (Downs 1957): 
every form of state intervention in society hinders the development of the free market and 
thus opposes the basic right of each individual for benefit maximization. This restriction 
is pejorative, since, according to the principle of individuality, the welfare of a society 
corresponds with the sum of the welfare of all of its individuals by means of rational 
benefit maximization. The administration is the central responsible body of state interven-
tions and therefore contradicts the principle of the free market. Even more, it reinforces 
government interference due to the system-immanent vicious circle. Individual officials 
primarily wish to maximize their budgets in accordance with the axiom of self-interest, 
hence causing an increasing government share, causing interventions, respectively back-
bonding the individual capacity for action (Niskanen 1971). Public administration thus 
fails as a system, not only in its task of appeasing its citizens (state failure), but also in 
being non-democratic at the same time. Thus, the public choice model generally stands 
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for a small-scale administration to confound hindering the market. the postulate stating 
that certain organizational structures lead to coordination is derived from the argument 
that individual striving for the best possible achievement of personal goals “can lead to 
cooperation, if individual social players are functionally dependent of each other, thus 
needing one another to achieve their own personal goals. (…) Individuals acting upon 
rational action cooperate, because they generate obligations which can be reclaimed later 
on in accordance with the principle of reciprocity” (Wittek and flache 2002, p. 75).
Within this goal, along the chosen dimensions of analysis, the institutional model 
of public choice can be characterized with the following central postulates in form of 
hypotheses: decentralization, fragmentation, generalist administration and direct political 
dependency.
0  With the decentralization of organizational structures, combined with an increase of 
autonomy of the thus created unities, more self-reliance and responsibility is del-
egated to the “frontline”, which orientates itself much more towards the citizen, or 
customer, than does the central administration. The loss of operative control options is 
compensated by an amplified strategic management and by appropriate quality guide-
lines from the politically responsible authorities. Decentralization has the advantage 
of having numerous benchmarks, which can help to measure the performance of each 
administration unit (schedler 1995, p. 95). While the advantages are an improvement 
in the gratification for its citizens, which leads to an increase in common welfare fol-
lowing the logics of economy, Budäus (1994, p. 56) summarizes the positive effects 
of decentralized structures for the public administration as follows: complexity is 
reduced and administrative operations become more transparent, because perform-
ance and costs can be clearly allocated. Consolidating the responsibility of each field 
and of the resources leads to a congruence of decision-making and responsibility for 
its consequences, whereby mechanisms of coordination, similar to competition, can 
be institutionalized within the administration.
0  Closely related to the postulate of decentralization is that of urban fragmentation, 
the argument of efficiency being central. Tiebout (1956) sees local governments as 
enterprises and its citizens as consumers. Accordingly, local governments try to offer 
their services to the lowest possible price, as desired by their citizens. These choose 
their district out of a combination of services and tax burdens, which are most in 
accordance with their preferences (tiebout 1956, p. 420). The more providers of pub-
lic goods exist, the more likely market conditions develop, which will lead to grati-
fication of individual needs and to an efficiency improvement of the supplies due to 
competition. One flaw of Tiebout’s model (1956) is his basic assumption that, first of 
all, mobility is free of costs, and, secondly, that job markets are insignificant. Further 
developments of the tiebout Model question the conditions under which an indi-
vidual “can shop around for services” (Tiebout 1956) without having to move away, 
and how these conditions can be established by inter-communal competition. Ostrom 
et al. (1988) argue that urban fragmentation and competition between local govern-
ments increase the allocative efficiency due to assets being transferred to those areas 
in which they can be employed in the most productive manner. A second argument of 
the public choice model is the fortification of the principles of democracy in the sense 
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of direct gratification of individual political preferences. It is argued that democracy 
is stronger the nearer politics is to its citizens.
0  The postulate of a non-professional administration, as that of a politically dependent 
one, are both derived from the consideration that individual gratification will be all 
the more fulfilled the less of a distance lies between the citizens and the administrative 
office offering certain public goods. This distance exists due to specialized expertise, 
or a lack of political control mechanisms and with autonomic scopes for action. the 
preponderance of specialized criteria at the loss of considering the actual demand 
while producing a public good should be countervailed by breaking up the hierarchi-
cal division of labor (Obsorne and Gaebler 1992, p. 47). Goal targeting in place of 
process control leads to different demands posed on the officials. Not the specialized 
responsible bodies of isolated functions will be needed in offices with “missions”, but 
rather broad-ranged generalists who are partially able to perform occasional sectoral 
coordination. With the declining of professionalization individual preferences will 
be less distorted with superordinated specialist concepts and will therefore be more 
gratified.
0  The postulate of a greatest possible politicized public service, meaning not appointed, 
but from the citizens concerned, or from their legitimate representatives elected serv-
ice, arises from the will to gratify individual citizen preferences as directly as possible 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992, p. 47). The solution of the public choice school lies in 
keeping the administration as small-sized as possible, and in putting it under the con-
trol of direct democracy (Kettl 2000; Lane 2000). the administration’s connection to 
democratic decision-making in order to be able to react quickly towards arising needs 
will be obligatory when officials are dependent on the voters’ goodwill. Because dese-
lection threatens by not fulfilling the majority of individual needs in this particular 
case. Political independence does not only increase the democratic legitimacy of an 
administration, but it also improves its service in terms of the collective as a sum of 
its parts.
3  Policy coordination as a mean to measure the collective capacity to act 
and hypotheses
As mentioned in the introduction, policy coordination is a central challenge to urban 
areas. It is the dependent variable of this analysis, respectively, according to QCA-Termi-
nology, the result to be verified. Fritz W. Scharpf (1972, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997) 
has been dealing with the issue of policy coordination since the 1970’s. scharpf under-
stands policy coordination as a concept of theoretical welfare: “Forms of reconciliation” 
are to be described, “whose welfare-theoretical high standards exceed the attainable (…) 
balance achieved by that of reciprocal anticipation in non-cooperative games”. In order 
to be a welfare-theoretical concept, policy coordination needs a clear, normative refer-
ence. the Pareto principle is the economical benchmark of welfare. It attests allocative 
efficiency to a solution “if no other solution is possible which would increase the benefit 
of at least one participant without another being disadvantaged in that course” (scharpf 
1992, p. 15). The “sheer abdication of unnecessary benefit circumvention” (Scharpf 1991, 
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p. 624) is, however, insufficient for an evaluation under a political science point of view. 
This is due to the fact that policy can disparately intervene in the market’s achievements, 
and is interested not only in welfare-theoretical efficiency, but also in distribution justice 
of the solutions found.
scharpf (1991, p. 624) describes the criterion of Kaldor (Kaldor 1939) as being a 
“better approach to a politically relevant term of welfare, as it evaluates all measures 
positively, whose use for the beneficiary is large enough to compensate all who are at 
disadvantage because of them. the normative issue of distribution justice is more easily 
solved in a Kaldor optimum as in solutions which are only Pareto-optimal. Contrary to the 
Pareto optimum, there is room for political distribution processes within Kaldor-optimal 
solutions.
Acccording to scharpf (1994, p. 28), the coordination dilemma is that Kaldor-optimal 
solutions are only successful in perfect hierarchies, or in perfect negotiations. Both forms 
of coordination have the disadvantage of losing their efficiency as soon as ideal condi-
tions are not fulfilled, they therefore do not occur in reality. So the “games real actors 
play” (scharpf 1997) occur aside of these ideal types. there are rather more institution-
ally embedded forms of self-coordination which oscillate as hybrid forms between these 
two ideal types. For the empirical description and evaluation of these forms of “negotia-
tions in the shadows of hierarchy” (scharpf 1972), four aspects will be analyzed in the 
following: Firstly the occurrence of coordination, secondly the quality of coordination 
processes, thirdly the quality of coordination results, and fourthly the actual implementa-
tion of the solution.
As listed above, the occurrence of coordination is chosen to be the first dependent vari-
able, concretely referring to aligning options of acting for all players involved in a mutual 
problem-solving process.
the second dependent variable is the formal rationality of coordination processes. 
While in the positive coordination new projects are multilaterally coordinated with all 
options of acting of all departments involved, the negative coordination, in an anticipa-
tive and bilateral manner, restricts all new projects to options not currently disposable, but 
compatible with accessible positions of all involved (scharpf 1993). Based on the argu-
mentation of scharpf (1993, 1994, 1997), stating that a negotiation obtains results closer 
to the Kaldor optimum the more compatible policy options are aligned, and the more 
consensual it is, a coordination process is described as being formal and rational when it 
is voluntary and multilateral, respectively when it coordinates positively and is rational in 
acting. Hybrid systems of negotiation processes are signified as formal, majorly rational 
(e.g. constraint negotiation, positive coordination and rationality of power). A formal, 
majorly non-rational process is negotiated under constraint, is bilaterally, or negatively 
coordinated and is of rational power. unilateral decrees and a complete lack of coordina-
tion are signified as formal non-rational.
the Kaldor optimum is chosen to be the third dependent variable. since it is a sheer 
theoretical construct, the coefficient must be modified. For this purpose, the term of 
substantial rationality will be implemented. In the following, an urban project will be 
described as being “substantially rational” when referring to a convergence to the Kaldor 
optimum. Partially substantial rationality refers merely to Pareto-superiority, which 
means that the use for the benefactors suffices only partially, not entirely compensating 
S63Institutional preconditions for the collective capacity to act …
for the “loser”, whereas a lack of substantial rationality, or no coordination, refers to the 
Pareto optimum.
A coordinated outcome is of little practical value if it will not actually be realized. 
In order to evaluate the coordination quality as a measure of the collective capacity 
to act, it therefore has to be taken into account whether an outcome will be politically 
accepted, which is necessary for its implementation. The implementation of the planning 
itself, meaning the constructive realization of a project, is therefore the fourth dependent 
variable.
On the basis of both models presented in the theoretical section the following hypoth-
eses can be formulated to explain the success of coordination, the neoprogressive pre-
sumptions ( np) and the public choice expectations ( pc) being mutually contradictory.
H1np:  centralized administrative management ensures successful coordination of policy.
H1pc:  decentralized administrative management ensures successful coordination of 
policy.
H2np:  consolidated urban areas ensure successful coordination of policy.
H2pc:  fragmented urban areas ensure successful coordination of policy.
H3np:  districts with a highly professionalized and specialized administration ensure suc-
cessful coordination of policy.
H3pc:  non-professional generalist administration ensures successful coordination of 
policy.
H4np:  politically autonomic administration ensures successful coordination of policy.
H4pc:  politically dependent administration ensures successful coordination of policy.
4  Research frame, case choices, methods, operationalisation and data
A so-called meta-analysis of seventeen case-studies on urban structure policy in nine 
Western European countries will be conducted for the empirical verification of the postu-
lated institutional effects. Meta-analyses describe the quantitative refurbishment of exist-
ing studies whose results are commonly presented in numerical form. the idea is that for 
the empirical approach to a theoretical issue, the analysis of existing studies can lead to 
a perception going beyond the mere results and experiences of these individual studies 
(Wolf 1986; Hunter and schmidt 1990). Additionally, methodological flaws of individual 
studies can be eliminated and results of great credibility can be achieved by aggregat-
ing the results. Particularly, potential sources of error caused by lacking sample size of 
individual studies can be partially minimized (Glass et al. 1994). since the questions 
dealt with affect modes of action which can only be analyzed by a diachronic analysis of 
the entire process procedures, a quantitative examination with qualitative case-by-case 
analyses will be performed in the present analysis. A very similar research strategy is 
used by Nijkamp et al. (2002). their meta-analysis of urban revitalization projects in the 
Netherlands is based on ex post coded qualitative case studies.
One central problem of meta-analyses is the validity which can be affected due to the 
heterogeneity of the chosen cases. this problem will be dealt with in the present research 
frame in two ways: Firstly, with a founded choice of cases with distinct criteria, and, 
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secondly, with a homogenous coding of the qualitative case studies along the following 
operationalisation (tables 2 and 3). the target population of the present study consisted 
of all at that point available studies dealing with coordinating spatially relevant political 
fields in urban areas from a sociological point of view. In order to be included in the target 
population, a study had to fulfil four criteria: it had to analyse a Western European met-
ropolitan area; it had to examine a case method dealing with the coordination of spatial 
and transport policy. It had to allow for coding along the presented operationalisation; and 
it had to fulfil certain formal scientific criteria. These case choice criteria will be briefly 
presented in the following section:
First of all, the studies had to focus on cases dealing with Western European urban 
areas. the limitation to Western europe allows for the dispersion of institutional vari-
ables, which is essential for the analysis because different national administrative and 
governmental cultures (Knill 1999; Lefèvre 1998; Raphael 2000). And, at the same time, 
the limitation offers a specific historical and cultural frame (Caramani 2005; Kaelble 
2002), distinguishing it from other world regions. Different cultural, historical and politi-
cally systemic variables can thereby be controlled, and a basic comparability of the cases 
is ensured.
Secondly, the cases had to pertain to the same fields of policy in order to avoid dis-
tortion due to singularities in different political fields. The problem of urban sprawl is 
primarily a problem of increasing social and geographical mobility. With increasing eco-
nomic wealth, urban residents move to the suburbs while their place of employment usu-
ally remains the same, thus prolonging the journey to work. Consequently, the volume 
of motorized private transport increases, since the public transport infrastructure is less 
well-developed in the less populated rural areas. This, in turn, primarily affects the stand-
ard of living in the core municipalities, making the rural areas even more attractive. The 
theoretical solution for urban areas lies in long-term re-urbanization. this means an eco-
logically, socially and economically compatible converse in urban sprawl tendencies. The 
two regionally significant fields of policy, urban and transport planning, play a central 
part in this multifarious task, in which urban sprawl mainly constitutes a spatial problem. 
More precisely, it will be necessary to resettle housing space, business and service enter-
prises to train stations and other junctions of public transport and road networks. this 
is implied by the cross-bordered coordination of spatial and transport policy (Dijst and 
schenkel 2002; Holz-Rau and Jansen 2007; Janssen-Jansen 2005; Kaufmann and sager 
2006; sager 2002).
Spatial and transport planning can therefore be seen as suitable test cases for examin-
ing policy coordination.
Thirdly, the case studies had to contain an analysis, or at least a description of insti-
tutional variables which stand in the center of this analysis. And the case study had to 
evaluate the coordination process, or rather its result.
And finally, fourthly, the formal criteria of Wolf (1993, p. 166) were applied for the 
choice of case studies. In order to be considered, a case study had to be based on empirical 
data, not on a model calculation. It had to contain a minimum of fifteen pages of analysis 
to allow for a founded encoding, a biography and references, and was not allowed to be 
produced by participants of the case being analysed.
s65Institutional preconditions for the collective capacity to act …
The procedure of choosing the cases consisted of a broad study of literature, whereas 
published studies on the one hand and grey literature of research cooperations on the 
other hand were screened. this search led to a total of seventeen case studies which were 
considered for the analysis on the basis of these criteria (cf. table 1)2. the selection cri-
teria focused on the aptitude of the examined case for the interrogation, and not on the 
cases themselves. This means that the case studies had to be comparative, and not the 
issues that were examined. These are, in accordance, not homogenous. Studies of great 
urban regions, such as Barcelona and Marseille, as well as those of smaller urban regions, 
such as Groningen and Freiburg, are used. In addition, there exists no even distribution 
among the framework of european countries. Although the comparability of the studies is 
assured by the selection criteria, this selection can obviously neither claim to be complete 
nor representative. this circumstance is taken into account by the choice of method being 
presented in the following.
these seventeen case studies will be systematically compared in the following. the 
four postulates for each model being tested can be understood as coherent groups of 
interdependent, institutionally influencing factors. The empirical section focuses on the 
combined effects of the institutional characteristics. Hereunto, the method of the Qualita-
tive Comparative Analysis (QCA) is applied (De Meur and Rihoux 2002; Ragin 1987, 
2000; Wagschal 1999, p. 291), which is especially applicable when comparing a medium 
range of cases. QCA is based on the basic principles of Boolean algebra which oper-
2 see sager (2002, S. 254–280) for the presentation of all considered cases.
Table 1:  the selected case studies
Case study Country Reference
 1. Mobility plan in flanders Belgium steenberghen 2000
 2.  Öresund-connection from Kopenhagen and 
Malmö
Denmark/sweden Matthiessen 2000
 3. Kopenhagen Metro Denmark Matthiessen 2000
 4. Traffic concept in Freiburg Germany Bratzel 1999
 5.  Agglomerational transport planning in Marseille france Margail and Offner 2000
 6.  Agglomerational transport planning in toulouse france Margail and Offner 2000
 7.  Agglomerational transport planning in Orléans france Margail and Offner 2000
 8. urban development planning in Newcastle Great Britain Guy et al. 2000
 9. Planning agreement in saronno Italy Morandi et al. 2000
10.  Integrated urban development planning in Rome Italy sessa and Gualdi 2000
11.  Development planning for the agglomeration 
Groningen
Netherlands Voogd 2000
12. transport concept in Amsterdam Netherlands Bratzel 1999
13. City tunnel in Malmö sweden Book and eskilsson 2000
14. Renewal of downtown staffanstorp sweden Book and eskilsson 2000
15. Restoring the Llobregat-river in Barcelona spain Junyent 2000
16. Port expansion in Barcelona spain Junyent 2000
17. Airport expansion in Barcelona spain Junyent 2000
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ates with the binary system. One precondition for applying QCA is using solely binary 
encoded variables.
The dichotomization associates a loss of information. Nevertheless, it was refrained 
from using a finer levelled encoding, which could have been interpreted with the enhance-
ment of the QCA, the so-called Fuzzy Sets (fsQCA). A finer levelled encoding would 
have increased the danger of arbitrary encoding, especially since the cases are qualitative 
case studies of different authors. The following operationalisation aims at a clear, qualita-
tive threshold value to distinguish the presence of a value (code 1) from its absence (code 
0). In this manner, the cases were encoded in a standardized way along the operationali-
sation of policy coordination (table 2), as in each of the four organizational dimensions 
(table 3).
table 2 shows the operationalisation of the four dependent variables.
the four described dimensions of organisation can be operationalised as independent 
variables or preconditions for the present study. In each variable both schools feature dif-
ferent values. table 3 presents the operationalisation of the independent variables.
The values of the variables are partly distorted, since the cases are not equally distrib-
uted among the European countries, and since the variables are partly dependent upon 
the constitutional context. The QCA meets this challenge with the logic of the Boolean 
algebra. The Boolean addition functions with the logical operator “or“, i.e. if two vari-
ables A and B signify 1 and the result Z is also 1, then the coherence A + B = Z is applied, 
resulting in 1 + 1 = 1 with the applied values. the result is also z = 1 if only A or only B 
has the value 1, this means that 0 + 1 = 1 and 1 + 0 = 1. The Boolean multiplication, con-
trary to addition, applies the logical operator “and”, thus according with conventional 
Table 2:  Operationalisation of the dependent variables/results
Results Given Mostly given Mostly not given Not given
Code 1 Code 0
Coordination 
symbol: K
•  Adaptation of players’ 
mindset occurs
– – •  Adaptation 
of players’ 
mindset does 
not occur
Formal 
rationality
symbol: F
•  Coordination is 
voluntary
•  Coordination is posi-
tive, i.e. multilateral
•  ethics of responsibil-
ity dominates
•  Coordination is 
negotiated
•  Coordination 
is superim-
posed and not 
negotiated
•  No 
coordination 
Substantial 
rationality
symbol: S
•  the solution found 
gratifies the interests 
of all involved, i.e. the 
benefit of the winner 
suffices for the com-
pensation of the loser 
•  The benefit for 
the winner par-
tially suffices for 
the compensa-
tion of the loser
– •  The benefit 
for the win-
ner is a loss 
to the loser 
Implementation
symbol: U
•  the solution found is 
implemented
•  the solution 
found is mostly 
implemented 
•  the solution 
found is mostly 
not implemented 
•  the solution 
found is not 
implemented
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binary variables of multiplication. the idea of QCA is to create so-called truth tables for 
the found values of the examined conditions, in which the observed combination of fac-
tors are combined. The configurations will be subsequently transcribed into additive and 
multiplicative formulas, whereas value 1 will be marked with capital letters, the value 0 
with lower case letters.
The case number of each observed source configuration is secondary, which is why 
the mentioned unequal distribution of the cases does not pose a problem. Cases lacking 
data will not be considered. In two steps, redundant variables will be eliminated from the 
formalized data of the truth tables using a minimizing algorithm (Quine-McCluskey algo-
rithm). This is to attain a definition of the dependent variables which contains a number of 
influential factors in specific combinations. This analysis will be applied in the following 
section for each of the four dependent variables.
table 4 offers an overview of the data obtained from binary encoding of the seventeen 
test cases.
5  Results
the results of the analysis using QCA will be presented along the four dependent 
variables.
Table 3:  Operationalisation of independent variables/preconditions
Precondition Neoprogressive model  Public choice model
Code 1 Code 0
Degree of 
centralization
•  Hierarchical project structure
•  In the hierarchy of the responsible 
government office high project 
management
•  Primus inter pares position with 
central coordination tasks in the 
responsible coordinating body within 
the administration 
• flat project structure
•  In the hierarchy of the respon-
sible government office low 
project management
•  the responsible coordinating 
body within the administration in 
the function of a site of free com-
munication without any central 
switch point
Degree of 
consolidation
•  status of agglomeration as a political 
unit, resp. as a separate federal level 
(region, district)
•  No status of agglomeration as 
a political unit: core municipal-
ity with equal agglomeration 
communities
Degree of 
professionalisation
•  No influence of the non-profes-
sional administrations of suburban 
communities for the process of 
decision-making
•  Tasks demanding professional exper-
tise are conducted primarily by the 
administration
•  the non-professional administra-
tion of suburban communities 
have influence on the process of 
decision-making
•  tasks demanding profes-
sional expertise are primarily 
outsourced
Degree of political 
autonomy
•  the political area is divided from the 
technical area
•  the political area and the techni-
cal area are not clearly divided
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5.1  Institutional configurations for establishing coordination
The population offers six constellations of the four conditions for the dependent size 
“coordination” out of sixteen possible combinations (4²). One constellation is derived 
from both results: the combination ZrPA leads to coordination in four of the examined 
cases (cases 5, 9, 11 and 16), in one case (case 8), however, it did not. Ragin (1987, p. 
116) provides several alternatives in dealing with such contradictory cases. the seem-
ingly useful alternative encodes the outcome of two ambiguous combinations with 0 and 
only includes constellations for an outcome of 1 if they are distinct3. the information 
derived from the encoded case studies can be transmitted into the following formula:
 
(1.1)
this result will be reduced to the core variables in a step-by-step operation. the core solu-
tion, which cannot be further minimized, is: (1.2)
The result of the QCA is accordingly: a process of coordination occurs, when
a)  a centralized organisation and fragmented urban area and a minor autonomy of the 
administration exist, or
b)  a centralized organisation and a consolidated urban structure and a high profession-
alization exist, or
c)  a fragmented urban structure and a high professionalization and a minor autonomy of 
the administration exist.
The defined result indicates that none of the four examined variables fulfil the required 
and sufficient conditions for establishing coordination, because none of the factors occur 
in all conditions, nor do they solely result in coordination. The result implicates neither 
the neoprogressive model nor the public choice model. It rather depends on the particular 
factors of configuration, whether the preconditions are liable to have a positive effect on 
the occurrence of coordination.
5.2  Institutional configurations for formal rationality
Six configurations are found for the dependent value of formal rationality (F), of which 
three are contradictory and will therefore be eliminated. Of the three distinct configura-
tions, two lead to formal rational coordination negotiations (F). Contrary to that, decreed 
coordination (f) is the result of only one definite configuration. The data can be transmit-
ted into the following equation: 
(2.1)
3 The second alternative is transcoding into a non-existent combination. This arbitrary approach 
will be neglected. The third alternative is a unified encoding of the outcome with 1, leading to 
several solutions, but being difficult to interpret (Ragin 1987, S. 116).
K = zrPa + Zrpa + ZrPa + ZRPa + ZRPA
K = Zra + ZRP+ rPa
F = Zrpa + ZRPa
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No implicants can be generated out of this equation. But the equation can be circum-
scribed as: 
(2.2)
formal rational coordination can therefore be observed in cases with a centralized organi-
zational structure and a minor autonomy of the administration and
a)  with either a fragmented urban area and a minor professionalization or
b)  with a consolidated urban area and a high professionalization exist.
the parameter values ‘high degree of centralization’ and ‘low degree of autonomy’ present 
a necessary condition, but are not sufficient, since they only lead to formal rational coor-
dination negotiations in combination with the two remaining variables. the two remain-
ing variables possess neither the necessary, nor the sufficient properties.
Consolidated urban structures have a positive effect on formal rational coordination 
if a high centralization of the institutional frame, a high professionalization and a minor 
autonomy of administration simultaneously exist. In contrast, formal rational coordina-
tion also occurs in fragmented structures, but only if a low professionalization is to be 
observed at the same time. In both cases, the horizontal integration of the institutional 
frame plays a primary role. Centralization supports formal rationality, or can even com-
pensate it. One other result shows that a politically dependent administration will initiate 
formal rational coordination negotiations rather than an apolitical one. In rather techno-
cratically organized Western european political systems with very strong urban admin-
istrations, a higher consideration for political interests obviously increases the process 
quality of policy coordination.
5.3  Institutional configuration for establishing substantial rationality
The case studies contain six different configurations for the dependent value substantial 
rationality (S), two of which are contradictory and lead to a negative result. In contrast, 
three configurations lead to substantial rationality, the initial equation being: 
(3.1)
two implicants can be formed out of this equation. the minimized equation is: 
(3.2)
The equation, in turn, can be circumscribed as 
(3.3)
substantial rationality is therefore achieved if a centralized organizational structure and a 
high professionalization occur, and
a)  either a minor autonomy of administration, or
b)  a consolidated urban area exists.
F = Za (rp+ RP)
S = ZrPa + ZRPa + ZRPA
S = ZPa + ZRP
S = ZP (a + R)
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It is shown that in order to achieve substantially rational results, two parameter values are 
necessary: a high centralization and a high professionalization, whereas the two remain-
ing variables do not necessarily need to occur. Neither of these variables offers a suffi-
cient source for substantial rationality.
With the exception of the effect of the political affiliation of administration, the results 
accord with the neoprogressive postulates. As with formal rationality, the positive effect 
of minor autonomy can be explained with the generally few possibilities of participation 
in European cities. Comparing professionalization and autonomy, it must be emphasized 
that professionalization is a necessary and therefore a more important precondition for 
substantially rational solutions, whereas autonomy is a replaceable condition and is there-
fore second-ranking.
5.4  Institutional configurations for implementation
Six configurations occur for the dependent value implementation, one of which is con-
tradictory and two lead to a negative outcome. Three configurations will therefore be 
factored into the QCA, which can be transferred into the following equation: 
(4.1)
By combining ZRPa and ZRPA to ZRP, the equation can be minimized as follows: 
(4.2)
Since this result cannot be further reduced, the QCA states that a realization of coordi-
nated planning occurs where
a)  a centralized organization and a fragmented urban area and a low professionalization 
and a minor autonomy of administration occur,
 or
b)  a centralized organization and a consolidated urban area and a high professionaliza-
tion exist.
The solution of the QCA is of special interest, since it defines the same result with two 
contradictory constellations, depending on whether a further parameter value occurs or 
not. To be precise, an implementation occurs when the necessary term ‘high centraliza-
tion’ occurs by fragmented and consolidated urban structures, as well as by high and low 
professionalization. It solely depends on whether the administration is politically depend-
ent or not.
In addition to the hitherto results, which mostly speak for the neoprogressive assump-
tions, it is shown that implementation occurs even under contradictory terms of these 
postulates. These will, however, be much stronger politicized as in consolidated areas 
with highly professionalized structures. the interpretation is therefore permissible that in 
consolidated areas improvements of the spatial situation are found primarily using tech-
U = Zrpa + ZRPa + ZRPA
U = Zrpa + ZRP
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nical expertise solutions. Contrary to that, these improvements in fragmented areas are 
found using politically dominated solutions, not solely technically legitimate ones.
5.5  When are substantially rational solutions implemented?
After discussing each dependent value separately, this section will deal with the ques-
tion under which circumstances substantially rational solutions will be implemented. to 
answer this question, the dataset was complemented with the new variable implementa-
tion I. It has the value 1 if a substantial rational solution is implemented and the value 0 
if a substantial rational solution is not implemented. eleven cases feature one of the two 
values of the variable and can therefore be evaluated. the Boolean value table (table 5) 
shows five cause configurations, all of which are definite. Two configurations do not lead 
to implementation, three lead to implementation.
In a first step, all configurations leading to implementation can be transmitted into an 
equation: 
(5.1)
The maximally reduced formula is: (5.2)
This solution definitely supports the neoprogressive model pertaining to the question 
when substantially rational solutions are implemented. A realization occurs if a high 
degree of centralization of the organization and a high professionalization and
a)  a high autonomy of the technical administration, or
b)  a high degree of consolidation exists.
In a second step the question will be when a substantially rational solution is not realized. 
The Boolean value table contains the two following configurations: (6.1)
Both configurations can be merged to the implicant rPa, since the value Z is of no signifi-
cance to the outcome. ensuing: 
(6.2)
the QCA solution also shows that the combination of fragmented urban structure and 
a high degree of professionalization and a minor autonomy of administration present a 
I = ZrPA + ZRPa + ZRPA
I = ZPA + ZRP
i = zrPa + ZrPa
i = rPa
Table 5:  Boolean value table for the dependent factor implementation I
Centraliza-
tion Z
Urban consoli-
dation R
Professionali-
zation P
Autonomy A Implementa-
tion I
Case number 
N
0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 3
1 1 1 0 1 3
1 1 1 1 1 3
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necessary and sufficient circumstance under which a substantially rational solution is not 
realized.
In both results, the neoprogressive model is more successful regarding the realization 
of coordinated policy solutions. A high degree of centralization or strong expertise knowl-
edge are necessary factors for a positive result either in combination with consolidated 
urban areas, or with a high autonomy of administration – all of which signify neoprogres-
sive postulates. Configurations which prevent implementation prove to be an effective 
mutual blockade of neoprogressive and public choice postulates. It is of special interest 
that this configuration rPa, predominantly in the equation (1.2), was identified at all as a 
possible condition for realizing coordination. Thus, the success of coordination processes 
regarding decisions and implementation is not ensured solely due to their presence. In 
fact, the same source configuration may lead to coordination processes on the one hand, 
but may prevent the realization of substantially rational solutions on the other.
No source configuration combines public choice postulates efficiently regarding estab-
lishing coordinated solutions in any of the cases. Therefore, in this comparison, the neo-
progressive model is considered to have better preconditions for realizing substantially 
rational planning decisions, and therefore for “establishing and stabilizing a collective 
capacity to act” (schimank 2002, p. 31).
6  Conclusion
the present essay interrogated the institutional conditions for a collective capacity to 
act in urban areas. the empirical results out of comparing seventeen case studies of 
decision-making processes in spatial and transport planning of Western european urban 
areas conclude that the neoprogressive model is the more successful of the two analyzed 
administration models. This is exemplarily shown using substantially rational solutions 
as a measurement for successfully solved problems of interdependence. A high degree of 
organizational centralization of the project structures and a high degree of professionali-
zation of the involved players prove to be a necessary precondition for realizing solutions 
in the analysis. These solutions comply with the Kaldor optimum, because the use for 
the beneficiaries is large enough to compensate all players disadvantaged by the method. 
Additionally, a high autonomy of administration or a high degree of consolidation must 
exist. Substantially rational solutions will be more likely implemented if developed under 
institutional preconditions which are in accordance with the postulates of the neoprogres-
sive school.
The complexity of institutional interdependency ascertained in the QCA does not sug-
gest any institutional ready-to-use solution regarding institutional reforms in metropolitan 
areas which could lead to a total reform of existing organizational arrangements with the 
“golden ratio”. It rather suggests the inductive approach for each step concerning specific 
problems. At the same time, the results speak for a certain rehabilitation of the classical 
administration in the sense of a vertical, differentiated organizational line with hierarchical 
control mechanisms. As the cases have shown, coordination costs can be reduced and con-
flicts prevented with hierarchical decision-making. Overall welfare-maximizing solutions 
will therefore be achieved with less effort, and they possess a higher political acceptance.
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these statements are somewhat contrary to the current mainstream of administrative 
science, which opts for an extensive breaking up of hierarchies and establishing horizon-
tal market situations between each administration office. Especially concerning policy 
coordination, it should be considered that the propagated market mechanisms from politi-
cal-economical reform models, such as the New Public Management, convey less coop-
erative, but more autarkic acting. Economical efficiency views lead in their own logic to 
more competition than to cooperation, and therefore contradict the coordination between 
policy fields, as well as between territorial units.
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